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In this short work, Eric Scerri seems to recommend that anyone seeking to understand the
periodic properties of the elements should concentrate on the work of obscure scientists rather
than on the famous investigators now featured in introductory chemistry courses. He tells
about seven individuals, currently nearly unknown, who provided results later incorporated
into developments generally considered to have been major breakthroughs but which advances
are usually attributed to scientists other than those discussed here.
These anti-heroic stories suggest what the author calls Ba new philosophy of science^ which
he has found useful Bto unify the various intellectual strands^ (p. xxiv) in his own life. The
basis of this approach is: Bscience proceeds by almost imperceptible small steps in an
evolutionary fashion, not so much through the genius and brilliance of individual scientists
but more by a process of trial and error, chance and sheer stumbling around. Above all, science
is a collective enterprise, but not consciously so^ (pp. 4–5). Scerri concedes that, in the past,
others have also advocated evolutionary and communitarian understandings of scientific
progress but asserts and that he arrived at his system independently, without studying earlier
authors.
The first two of the seven scientists covered here dealt with large questions. British
physicist John Nicholson (1881–1955) was interested in the spectra of astronomical nebulae
and also in the weights of chemical elements and the internal structure of atoms. He postulated
that the elements with which we are familiar were produced from several Bproto-elements^
which no longer exist on Earth but which persist in distant nebulae. Using theories based on
such ideas (most of which were quite contrary to then-established and also later
understandings—that is, those notions were wrong) he was able to compute quite accurate
atomic weights for most of the then-known elements and to rationalize complex line-spectra of
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the Orion Nebula and of the solar corona. Nicholson also correctly predicted frequencies of a
number of spectral lines that had not been observed before his publications but were found
shortly thereafter. He also came to the conclusion that the angular momentum of electrons
within atoms must be quantized. Although earlier versions of Niels Bohr’s theory of the
electronic structure of atoms did not include this feature, quantization of electronic angular
momentum became quite prominent in Bohr’s later revisions—and Bohr fully credited
Nicholson with having discovered that quantization.
Dutch lawyer Anton Van den Broek (1870–1925) developed a serious spectator’s interest in
atomic physics. He followed up an incidental suggestion of Mendeleev and designed a three-
dimensional periodic table. He also closely studied Geiger and Marsden’s reports of how
alpha-particles were scattered by various elements. Shortly after Rutherford published his
conclusion that atoms had positively-charged nuclei (without specifying the magnitude of
nuclear charge), Van den Broek, based on numerical analysis of experimental results of others,
suggested (in Nature, no less) that the charge of each atomic nucleus was equal to the index-
number of that element in the periodic table. Henry Moseley later stated that his justly-famous
experiments (which established the correctness of this suggestion) were carried out Bwith the
express purpose of testing Van den Broek’s hypothesis.^
Introductory chemistry courses frequently consider how electrons distribute themselves
among energy levels and energy sublevels in the lowest-energy states of individual atoms of
each of the elements1—as if such information was important in determining periodic proper-
ties. The remaining five of the scientists covered in this book made important contributions in
this context. German electrochemist Richard Abegg (1869–1910) was important in the
development of the electronic understanding of the combining capacities of atoms. English
chemist Charles Bury (1890–1968) clarified the relationship between the electronic structure
of atoms of the elements and their placement in the periodic table. British chemist, John D.
Main Smith2 showed how atomic electron-shells are structured, with two electrons more
tightly held than the rest.3 English physicist Edmund Clifton Stoner (1899–1968) developed
more-adequate models of sublevel structure and of collective-electron ferromagnetism. French
engineer, Charles Janet (1849–1932)4—among other contributions—developed the left-step
periodic table.
In the past, chemists have often made important contributions to philosophy. Charles
Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), generally recognized as one of the most significant of North-
American philosophers, identified himself as a chemist throughout his career. Hilary Putnam
documented that Peirce’s important contributions to the logic of relations were widely known
among European logicians in the late nineteenth century, at a time when Gottlob Frege’s
related work (published 4 years earlier than Peirce’s) remained largely unknown.5 Frege’s
logical work became widely known only after Bertrand Russell revived it in connection with
his advocacy of logic-centered philosophies such as those now called Bpositivism^ and
Banalytical philosophy.^ Michael Polanyi (1891–1976), Hungarian-born British physical
chemist and philosopher, argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which
1 Such as might conceivably be found in highly dilute vapors of monatomic gases, if such did exist.
2 Dates for John Main Smith do not seem to be available.
3 Main Smith Bdiscovered the s-electrons^.
4 Janet worked sequentially in geology, entomology, biology, and chemistry, each for about 10 years, and
achieved notable—but not outstanding—success in each of those areas.
5 Peirce’s linear notation was used in the important logical works of that era, whereas no one else ever used
Frege’s three-dimensional notational system.
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if taken seriously undermines our highest achievements as human beings. Polanyi vigorously
advocated the view that science was a community enterprise, dependent on shared
Binterpretive frameworks.^
German-born British philosopher, Heinz Post, Eric Scerri’s Ph.D. mentor, was much
impressed by how, in 1962 and later, the work of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1976) on scientific
revolutions brought about shifts in general philosophical understanding of scientific develop-
ment.6 Kuhn was certainly aware of Polanyi’s work and on some occasions indicated that he
was influenced by it. Many authors have pointed out strong similarities between Kuhn’s
Bparadigms^ and the awkwardly-named Binterpretive frameworks^ described by Polanyi.
Though both Polanyi and Kuhn recognized similarities in their approaches, each pointed out
their fundamental difference in general outlook from the other. Kuhn was generally understood
as denying that science leads to truth, thereby generating accusations of relativism. Kuhn
denied those accusations, but formally rather than persuasively. Post distanced himself from
Kuhn, stating: BContrary to Kuhn, I believe that scientific theory converges towards a unique
truth.^ Throughout this book, Eric Scerri downplays the scientific importance of truth and
falsity, while also inserting what amount to formal denials of relativism.
Scerri does recognize that the general philosophical approach that dominated North-
American academic philosophy for decades has now run into problems. Toward the end of
the present work (p. 212) he asks: BWhy, one might ask, has analytical philosophy of science
not withered away yet?^ Perhaps, an anti-analytical objection Marjorie Grene raised against
philosopher Arthur Fine might be applicable both to Kuhn’s work and also to Scerri’s more-
recent effort. Grene claimed that Fine held that realism must be justified by an argument more
rigorous and exact than the methods by which scientific conclusions are reached. That is, the
notion of truth which some (perhaps many) analytically-trained philosophers have internalized
is Ba God’s-eye view^—an account of reality which would be adequate for any and every
conceivable purpose. This hypothetical notion of truth might well be coherent with logic-
focused philosophy but it is not consistent with contemporary (post-Peirce) scientific realisms,
such as Rom Harré’s Bpolicy realism.^
A striking characteristic of contemporary philosophy of science7 seems to be that those who
vigorously defend certain explanatory levels as fundamental then tend to display little or no
interest regarding what can validly be inferred concerning those levels. Jaegwon Kim, for
instance, vigorously argues that physical processes can all be understood in term of functioning
of submicroscopic entities, but makes no explicit use of submicroscopic reasoning in his own
work. Similarly, in this book, Eric Scerri argues that scientific research is much like biological
evolution, but refers to the obsolete8 quasi-biological concept Bmissing link^ as if it were in
current use in discussions in evolutionary science, and gives short shrift to conclusions of
recent biological researchers, barely mentioning the powerful notion of punctuated equilibri-
um. (It is widely agreed that pattern is important, even though how it should be explained is
debated.) Current studies of the evolution of microorganisms (where rapid generation-turnover
facilitates study of evolution, see van Boxtel, C. et al. BTaking chances and making mistakes^)
demonstrate that the course of evolution is partially determined by regularities of several sorts,
but is additionally determined by contingent circumstances of many types. Factors involved in
6 Post was especially interested in how major scientific changes often preserve significant pieces of earlier
approaches (Bthe correspondence principle^).
7 Remarkably, neither philosophers nor scientists show much interest in Bphilosophy of science.^
8 Prominent in the 1908 controversy regarding the Piltdown man.
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the origin of novelties are important—but characteristics which influence the Bspread of
novelties through populations^ are often of even more significance. Such considerations seem
to be pertinent to why, although Michael Polanyi’s approach still has strong supporters,
Thomas Kuhn’s work achieved (and retains) much wider acceptance.
The result typified by the Polanyi/Kuhn contrast can also be seen in non-philosophical
chemistry. In 1954, John O. Edwards correlated rates of nucleophilic chemical reactions in
terms of two parameters (basicity to protons and polarizability), characteristic of each reactant
nucleophile. In 1961 and 1962, Edwards published results of collaborative research with Ralph
Pearson. Starting in 1963, Pearson published many papers, reviews, and chapters all vigor-
ously promoting his theory of hard and soft acids and bases (HSAB). This generalized the
approach Edwards had used on nucleophiles to wider subject-areas and re-packaged it using
concise and easily-remembered terms. BThe Edwards equation^ is still used by some few
organic chemists, but HSAB theory generated much more widespread and lasting interest than
Edwards’ work had ever received. Analogous to the cases of microorganism evolution and
philosophical theory-acceptance, contingent details of how scientific innovations are presented
and promoted have profound influence on how or whether those innovations spread and
persist. Pearson’s developments of Edwards’ approach—relatively superficial though they
may have been—were in fact highly important.
It is surely the case that scientific progress occurs by an evolutionary process and that
science is mainly communitarian rather than principally individualistic. As mentioned above,
chemist-philosophers Charles Peirce in the nineteenth century and Michael Polanyi in the mid-
twentieth century made closely similar points. Those conclusions are new only in as much as
they differ from the customary presuppositions of many analytical philosophers.
Postmodern literary critic, John Barth recommended that, to appreciate any historical
period, students of literature should read mediocre writers rather than great ones. This seems
to be similar to Scerri’s counsel to pay more attention to now-obscure scientists. Barth wrote
The Sot Weed Factor (in part, at least) to illustrate his advice. That 1960 novel runs tediously
on for more than 740 often rather-turgid pages. Chemical educators surely will want to include
aspects of the interesting stories that are told in this book in their courses, but they should think
long and hard before they abandon linking major conceptual shifts to specific historical
figures. At least since ~ 700 B.C. when Hesiod composed his Theogany, tales about outstand-
ing individuals and their (however mythical) achievements have been both memorable and
inspiring in ways that more historically-accurate accounts usually are not.
This book contains a selection of interesting background-stories for one of the main themes
of introductory chemistry courses, and also provides some first-hand testimony about how
analytically-trained philosophers can belatedly discover aspects of reality inconsistent with
their own earlier presuppositions without taking notice of the earlier work of others on those
aspects.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The author of this review asserts that no conflicts of interest exist regarding this review or
its contents.
J. E. Earley
